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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a goal programming methodology to ensure that a mix of balance and 
optimisation is achieved across a hierarchical decision network. The extended goal 
programming principle is used for this purpose. A model is constructed that provides 
consideration of balance and efficiency of multiple objectives and stakeholders at each 
network node level. A goal programming formulation to provide the decision that best meets 
the goals of the network is given. The proposed model is controlled by three key parameters 
that represent the level of non-compensation between objectives, level of non-compensation 
between stakeholders, and level of centralisation in the network. The methodology is 
demonstrated on an example pertaining to regional renewable energy generation and the 
results are discussed. Conclusions are drawn as to the effect of different attitudes towards 
compensatory behaviour between objectives and stakeholders in the network.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The initial goal programming model is proposed by (Charnes & Cooper, 1961) as a means of 
modelling the satisficing philosophy of (Simon, 1957) in a mathematical programming 
framework. Since then, the technique of goal programming has been developed to encompass 
many variants and fields of application (Jones & Tamiz, 2010). The fundamental variants are 
lexicographic, which combines ordering and satisficing philosophies; weighted, which 
combines optimising (Pareto, 1896) and satisficing philosophies and Chebyshev, which 
combines satisficing and balancing (Rawls, 1973) philosophies. More recently advanced 
variants have been proposed that provide effective frameworks for combining philosophies 
and modelling modern complex decision problems involving multiple, conflicting goals. 
These include meta-goal programming (Rodrı́guez Urı́a, Caballero, Ruiz, & Romero, 2002), 
extended goal programming (Romero, 2001, Romero, 2004) and multi-choice goal 
programming (Chang, 2008). The meta-goal programming model proposes the concept of a 
meta-goal, a high level goal that goes beyond a single goal and gives an overall measure of 
satisfaction for the decision maker. In this context the extended goal programming model can 
be seen as comprising two meta-objectives: the minimisation of the weighted, normalised 
sum of unwanted deviations from the set of goals (using the 𝐿𝐿1 distance function and 
representing efficiency and optimising principles) and the minimisation of the maximal 
weighted, unwanted, normalised deviation from amongst the set of goals (using the 𝐿𝐿∞ 
distance function and representing balancing and social justice principles).  A parametric 
analysis can be undertaken to determine the trade-off between balance and optimisation in 
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decision or objective space. On the other hand, the multi-choice goal programming model 
allows the decision maker to specify multiple target values for each goal. Definitions of 
the 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 distance functions and their relationship within the goal programming model are given 
in (Romero, Tamiz, & Jones, 1998). In combination, the above goal programming variants 
provide a comprehensive methodology for modelling diverse decision maker preferences and 
underlying philosophies. However, they also have the commonality that they focus on the 
expressed goals of a single entity, either a single decision maker or a group of decision 
makers with unified goals. This is a different decision making situation to a network of 
stakeholders, all of whom have some influence on the decision(s) to be made but may have 
different preferences and views on importance and compensation amongst the set of 
objectives under consideration.   The methodology presented in this paper is concerned with 
examining the mix between balancing and optimisation philosophies over a network of 
stakeholders. The effects of compensatory (𝐿𝐿1) and non-compensatory (𝐿𝐿∞) behaviour with 
respect to both the multiple stakeholders in different parts of the network and multiple 
objectives is examined. Extended goal programming is chosen as the base technique for the 
methodology due to its synergies and similarities with the required analysis. In fact, the 
methodology developed in this paper can also be seen as an extension of and contribution to 
the literature on extended goal programming.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into 4 sections. Section 2 presents a more detailed 
discussion of extended goal programming as well as detailing the literature on goal 
programming for networks of decisions and multiple stakeholders. Section 3 develops the 
methodology for, and algebraic form of, the network extended goal programming model. 
Section 4 presents a hypothetical example from the field of renewable energy planning in 
order to demonstrate the methodology and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 draws 
conclusions.  
 
2. Relevant Goal Programming Topics 
 
This Section reviews the current state-of-the-art of goal programming in the topics of 
relevance to this paper. These are divided into three sub-sections. The extended goal 
programming model variant; the use of goal programming to model networks of decisions 
and multiple stakeholders; and the inclusion of the Rawlsian philosophies of social justice, 
balance, and fairness.  
 
2.1 Extended Goal Programming 
 
As described in Section 1, the extended goal programming model is introduced by (Romero, 
2001, Romero, 2004) to allow a parametric analysis of the trade-off between efficiency and 
balance between the levels of achievement of the goal target values. Lexicographic and non-
lexicographic forms of the model are presented for the cases of the presence and absence of a 
lexicographic ordering of goals respectively. As this paper is concerned primarily with 
investigations of efficiency-balance trade-offs between stakeholders and objectives over a 
decision network rather than prioritising of objectives the non-lexicographic form of the 
extended goal programming model is used. Assuming a linear form of the achievement 
function, percentage normalisation, and positive target values (𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 > 0, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑞𝑞) (Jones & 
Tamiz, 2010) gives the following algebraic model: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 𝑎𝑎 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) � �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
�
𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖=1
�      (1) 
 
 
 
Subject to: 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖
≤ 𝛼𝛼      𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞                      (2)  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥� + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖              𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞        (3)  𝑥𝑥  ∈ 𝐹𝐹          (4)  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0             𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞                                (5) 
 
Model (1-5) is defined as having 𝑞𝑞 objectives and a set 𝑥𝑥 of decision variables. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥�  is the 
achieved value of the 𝑖𝑖’th objective which has an associated target value of  𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖. Deviational 
variables 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 denote the negative and positive deviations from the 𝑖𝑖’th target value 
respectively. The maximal weighted deviation from amongst the set of unwanted deviations 
is denoted by λ. The weights 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 are associated with the relative level of importance 
associated with the minimisation of the negative and positive deviational variables from the 
𝑖𝑖’th target value respectively. Unwanted deviations are given a positive weight and deviations 
which are not desired to be minimised are given a zero weight. 𝛼𝛼 is a parameter which 
controls the relative importance of efficiency and equity in the model. Note that whilst this 
model has assumed percentage normalisation and positive target values, other forms of 
normalisation could also be considered, which in turn could allow for the inclusion of non-
positive target values.  
    
The extended goal programming formulation allows for the inclusion and combination of the 
optimisation, balancing, and satisficing underlying philosophies of a single decision making 
entity (Jones & Tamiz, 2010). The satisfying philosophy is evident in the set of goals. The 
optimising philosophy is achieved via the minimisation of the weighted sum of deviations 
(second term in the achievement function (1)) with the use of sufficiently optimistic target 
goal values. The balancing philosophy is achieved through the inclusion of the maximal 
deviation (first) term in the achievement function (1). Furthermore, the balance between 
optimisation (efficiency) and balance (equity) can be controlled at each priority level through 
the parameter  which can be varied between complete emphasis on optimisation ( ) 
and complete emphasis on balance ( ). The EGP framework is therefore a 
comprehensive tool for the inclusion of three types of underlying philosophies amongst a set 
of objectives on a single decision level into the goal programming framework.  This 
framework has been further enhanced by since its inception. (Jones & Jimenez, 2013) 
propose two further meta-objectives to add to the original two of optimisation and balance. 
These are the number of goals achieved (representing a target achieving philosophy) and 
consistency with pairwise comparison matrix judgements in the case that they are used to 
provide the set of weights. It has hitherto been developed in single decision layer form rather 
than in hierarchical network form, as proposed in this paper.   
 
2.2 Networks of Decisions and Multiple Stakeholders 
 
Many multiple criteria problems involve multiple stakeholders, who are defined as entities 
(organisations, individuals, or societal groups) who are affected by the decision to be made. 
An indicative, but not exhaustive, review of the use of goal programming for problems with 
either multiple stakeholders or a network structure is given by the remainder of this 
paragraph. The initial example of the use of goal programming to make decisions over a 
hierarchical network is given by (Charnes, Haynes, Hazleton, & Ryan, 1975) who formulate 
a model a three level network for environmental land use planning. The model considers 
0=α
1=α
 
 
economic and environmental objectives, as well as stakeholders including demographical and 
industrial groups, and has an assumed governmental decision maker.  Recent examples of 
goal programming models that consider multiple stakeholders include (Nixon, Dey, Davies, 
Sagi, & Berry, 2014) who consider the optimal location of biomass plants on a regional level 
in India considering the needs of farmers, investors, and downstream consumers of 
electricity. (Gebrezgabher, Meuwissen, & Oude Lansink, 2014) construct a economically, 
socially and environmentally sustainable manure management system, using a combination 
of compromise programming and goal programming based AHP that considers the needs of 
both farmers and the wider society. (Giménez, Bertomeu, Diaz-Balteiro, & Romero, 2013) 
apply extended goal programming for Eucalyptus plantation management considering 
economic and sustainability criteria and give suggestions for extensions to a multiple 
stakeholder situation. (Li, Beullens, Jones, & Tamiz, 2008) develop a two-level decision 
model of a hospital considering bed allocation at both a departmental and hospital level to 
meet economic and performance goals.  The above examples demonstrate that goal 
programming is indeed a pragmatic tool for considering different stakeholder groups and 
complex decisions over a network that may represent geographical regions, technological 
types, multiple organisations or subdivisions of an organisation, socio-economic groups, or 
communities. However, there is not yet a clear methodological basis as to how the interests of 
these groups are represented and combined across a decision network, especially when the 
mix of compensatory and non-compensatory behaviour amongst both stakeholders and 
objectives is present. This paper makes a contribution towards the development of a relevant 
methodology in this area.  
 
Note that this paper makes a distinction between multiple stakeholders and multiple decision 
makers. The latter case assumes the responsibility for a decision lies with a group of decision 
makers. The methodology in this case belongs to the field of group decision making. A recent 
example of the use of goal programming to aid group decision making in the context of the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process is given by (Wang & Li, 2015). In contrast, this paper is 
concerned with the case where the actual decision belongs to a single decision maker with 
responsibility for considering the needs and opinions of multiple stakeholders who will be 
affected by the decision. It is often the case that a given stakeholder will have more interest 
in, and hence place more emphasis on, a subset of the objectives and/or decisions to be made. 
Different stakeholders may hence have different views on the level of importance to be 
assigned to individual objectives and the level of compensation between objectives and 
between stakeholders that should be employed.  
 
2.3 Concepts of Social Justice, Fairness and Balance in Goal Programming  
 
The concept of fairness or balance is originally introduced into the goal programming 
framework by (Flavell, 1976) who proposes the Chebyshev goal programming model. This 
variant is based around the 𝐿𝐿∞ distance function which links to the Rawlsian theory of social 
justice (Rawls, 1973). Minimising the maximum weighted, normalised deviation from a goal 
ensures that a balance between the levels of satisfaction of the goals is achieved. Chebyshev 
goal programming is hence associated with the concepts of fairness, equality, and social 
justice. However, it is important to note that the Chebyshev variant only explicitly treats the 
fairness and balance between objectives rather than between stakeholders or different subset 
of objectives that may have importance in the context of the model. The Chebyshev variant is 
integrated in the variant encompassing extended goal programming model as detailed in 
Section 3. It has been practically used to control vibration in vehicle suspension (Li, Liang, 
Wang, & Dong, 2012); to allocate maintenance technicians to toolsets in a semiconductor 
 
 
manufacturing plant (Ignizio, 2004); and to select portfolios of mutual funds (Tamiz, Azmi, 
& Jones, 2013). 
 
 
3. Formulation of Extended Goal Programming Model with a Network of 
Multiple Stakeholders and Objectives 
 
This section proposes a model for parametric consideration of efficiency and balance over 
hierarchical decision network consisting of 𝐿𝐿 layers with multiple objectives and multiple 
stakeholders. It is assumed that each stakeholder is associated with one particular node in the 
network which could, for instance, represent a particular geographical region or sub-division 
of an organisation. The presented model does not however preclude extension to cover 
stakeholders with interests that cover multiple nodes or layers of the network. A stakeholder 
will have their own preferential data with respect to the set of objectives regarded as 
important, and in some cases place minimal or no importance on a particular objective. Each 
stakeholder may also have different views on the level of compensation between objectives. 
These preferential considerations are incorporated into the model presented in formulation 
(6)-(11).  Each network layer 𝑙𝑙 consists of 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 nodes. The following algebraic model has the 
capacity to consider balance and efficiency both amongst objectives at a given node and 
amongst stakeholders at a given level: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑤𝑤1 �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗1𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗1 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗1)��𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗1𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗1
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗1
+ 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗1𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗1
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗1
�
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
�                                                       (6)      
+ �𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 �𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙) � �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 + �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙���𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
+ 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
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𝑘𝑘=1
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𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙=1
�
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Subject to,  
 
𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙�𝑥𝑥� + 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙       𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾;    𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙;    𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿                       (7) 
 
𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
+ 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑙𝑙        𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾;    𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙;    𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿                            (8) 
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𝑙𝑙 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙)��𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
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+ 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙
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𝑘𝑘=1
� ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙     𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙;    𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿        (9) 
  𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐹𝐹                                                                                                                                      (10) 
𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ,𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0     𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾;    𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙;    𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿                                          𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0    𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙;    𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿;    𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0     𝑙𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿𝐿                                     (11)  
 
Where 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙�𝑥𝑥� is a function of decision variable set 𝑥𝑥 that gives the achieved value of 
objective 𝑘𝑘 at node 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 at network level 𝑙𝑙. 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  and 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 are the negative and positive deviations 
from goal target level 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  of objective 𝑘𝑘 at node 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 at network level 𝑙𝑙 respectively. 𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  and 𝑣𝑣𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  
 
 
are the weights associated with penalisation of negative and positive deviations from the goal 
target level of objective 𝑘𝑘 at node 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 at network level 𝑙𝑙 respectively. If a deviation is not to be 
penalised then its associated weight should be set to zero. If a particular objective is not 
relevant at a node then both associated weights should be set to zero. 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  represents the 
maximal weighted, normalised deviation from amongst the set of objectives at node 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 at 
network level 𝑙𝑙. 𝐷𝐷𝑙𝑙 represents the maximum combined measure of stakeholder dissatisfaction 
amongst the set of nodes at network level 𝑙𝑙. These are the two key measures of balance in the 
model. It is also important to note that the first level has been modelled as a separate term in 
the achievement function (6). This is due to the fact that it represents the centralisation 
portion of the network as opposed to the other levels, which represent the devolved decision 
making in the network. Hence there are important philosophical and modelling reasons that 
justify its separate consideration. A diagrammatical illustration of the extended network goal 
programming algebraic model (7)-(11) is given by Figure 1. There are three principal 
parameter sets in the model: 
 
1) 𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙 is the relative level of importance given to network level 𝑙𝑙. The set of network 
level weights 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤1,𝑤𝑤2, … ,𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 gives the centralisation versus decentralisation 
strategy of the decision maker. It is suggested that the network level weights 𝑤𝑤 are 
normalised via the following equation: 
�𝑤𝑤𝑙𝑙
𝐿𝐿
𝑙𝑙=1
= 1 
 
2) 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  gives the level of consideration of balance versus optimisation amongst 
objectives at node 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 at network level 𝑙𝑙. It is subject to the bounds 0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ≤ 1, 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 0 indicates the stakeholder(s) associated with that node is solely 
interested in the (weighted sum) efficiency of the objectives and 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 = 1 indicates the 
stakeholder(s) associated with that node is solely interested in the (minmax) balance 
of the objectives. Thus 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  can be seen as a measure of consideration of the balance 
and efficiency mix between objectives.  
 
3) 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 gives the level of consideration of balance versus optimisation amongst 
stakeholders scores at network level 𝑙𝑙. It is subject to the bounds 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 ≤ 1, where 
𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 = 0 indicates that importance at network level 𝑙𝑙 is solely given to the average 
stakeholder dissatisfaction and 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 = 1 indicates that importance is solely given to the 
maximal stakeholder dissatisfaction at that level. Thus 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙 can be seen as a measure of 
consideration of the balance and efficiency mix between stakeholders at network level 
𝑙𝑙.  
 
As previous stated, the decision network is assumed to be controlled by a single decision 
maker whose role is to consider all stakeholders in the decisions to be made. A parametric 
analysis around the three key parameter sets is proposed in order that the decision maker gain 
understanding about the nature of the trade-offs between balance and efficiency and the effect 
of compensatory behaviour in the model. An example of a parametric analysis is given in the 
model presented in Section 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic illustration of the extended network goal programming model  
 
4. An Illustrative Example 
 
   This section develops an example decision network related to regional development of 
renewable energy sources in order to test and illustrate the model developed in Section 3. The 
model has two levels (regional and global) and four sets of goals relating to energy 
generation, cost, environmental impact, and number of projects developed. Parametric 
analysis is then performed on a specific four region instance. The data used is hypothetical as 
the purpose is illustration of method. The objectives and problem formulation are however, 
inspired by the authors work on various European Union and Sao Paulo state, Brazil funded 
projects on the development of mathematical models for renewable energy (Jones & Wall, 
2015).   
 
4.1 Notation 
 
Following mathematical programming convention, the model description is divided into 
required input data; parameters to control the experimentation (the weights are considered as 
 
 
parameters in this instance as, although the decision maker may have an initial estimate, some 
form of informal or formal sensitivity analysis may be necessary (Jones, 2011)); decision 
variables; and an algebraic model.  
 
4.1.1 Data 
 
𝑀𝑀: number of potential projects; 
𝐽𝐽: Number of regions; 
𝐾𝐾: Number of electricity generation types; 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗: Set of projects belonging to region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘: Set of projects of electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘; 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘(= 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 ∩ 𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘): Set of projects of electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 belonging to region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖: Energy generation (average) from potential project 𝑖𝑖; 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸: Global energy generation target (aim is to achieve no less than this target); 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗: Energy generation target for region  𝑗𝑗   (aim is to achieve no less than these targets); 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖: Estimate annual cost for potential project 𝑖𝑖; 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸: Global cost target (aim is to achieve no more than this target); 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗:  Energy cost target for region  𝑗𝑗  (aim is to achieve no more than these targets); 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖: Estimated environmental impact from potential project 𝑖𝑖; 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸:  Global environmental impact target (aim is to achieve no more than this target); 
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗:  Environmental impact target for region  𝑗𝑗 (aim is to achieve no more than these 
targets); 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘: Global target for number of projects of electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 (aim is to achieve 
no less than these targets); 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘: Target for number of projects of electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 in region  𝑗𝑗 (aim is to 
achieve no less than these targets); 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 Minimum number of projects to be selected in region  𝑗𝑗. 
 
4.1.2 Parameters 
 
𝑤𝑤: Controls global-regional weighting; 
𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺: Controls mix of optimisation and balance at a global level; 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅:  Controls mix of optimisation and balance in individual region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝛽𝛽 ∶ Controls mix of optimisation and balance when considering set of regions; 
𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺:  Weight associated with penalising negative deviation from global energy target; 
𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶
𝐺𝐺:  Weight associated with penalising positive deviation from global cost target; 
𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺: Weight associated with penalising positive deviation from global environmental 
target; 
𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘
𝐺𝐺 : Weight associated with penalising negative deviation from global target for electricity 
generation type 𝑘𝑘; 
𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Weight associated with penalising negative deviation from energy target of region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Weight associated with penalising positive deviation from cost target of region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 :  Weight associated with penalising positive deviation from environmental target of 
region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
𝑅𝑅 : Weight associated with penalising negative deviation from target for electricity 
generation type 𝑘𝑘 in region  𝑗𝑗. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Decision Variables 
 
The following sets of decision and deviation variables are specified 
  
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = �1   𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠0 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝    𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀𝑀      
 
𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺: Maximal deviation from set of global normalised, weighted goals; 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅: Maximal deviation from set of global normalised, weighted goals in region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝐷𝐷: Maximal measure from amongst the set of regions (the worst performing region); 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺: Negative deviation from global energy target; 
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺: Positive deviation from global energy target; 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶
𝐺𝐺: Negative deviation from global cost target; 
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶
𝐺𝐺: Positive deviation from global cost target; 
𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺 : Negative deviation from global environmental target; 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺: Positive deviation from global environmental target; 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘
𝐺𝐺 : Negative deviation from global electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 target; 
𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘
𝐺𝐺 : Positive deviation from global electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 target; 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Negative deviation from energy target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Positive deviation from energy target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Negative deviation from cost target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 :  Positive deviation from cost target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Negative deviation from environmental target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 : Positive deviation from environmental target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
𝑅𝑅 : Negative deviation from electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 target for region  𝑗𝑗; 
𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
𝑅𝑅 : Positive deviation from electricity generation type 𝑘𝑘 target for region  𝑗𝑗. 
 
4.1.4 Algebraic Model  
 
The algebraic form of the two-layer network extended goal programming is given by 
equations (12)-(26).  
 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑤𝑤 �𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺)�𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
+ 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸
+ 𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺
𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸
+ �𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
�� 
+(1 −𝑤𝑤) �𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅) �𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 �𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �    (12) 
   Subject to,   
 
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 − 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸                                                                                                 (13) 
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺 = 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸                                                                                                 (14) 
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 − 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 = 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸                                                                                                (15) 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 − 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 = 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘    𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾                                                                       (16) 
∑ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 − 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                        (17) 
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 − 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 = 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                        (18) 
 
 
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸 𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 − 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 = 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                       (19) 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 − 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 = 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘    𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾;     𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                           (20) 
𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺
𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 , 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 , 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺
𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 ,∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺
𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1 ≤ 𝛼𝛼
𝐺𝐺                                                         (21) 
𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝑅𝑅
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 , 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 , 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅
𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 ,∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇
≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1      𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                           (22) 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 + �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅� �𝑢𝑢𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + 𝑣𝑣𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸 + ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 � ≤ 𝐷𝐷    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽               (23) 
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖∈𝑄𝑄𝐸𝐸    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                                              (24) 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 1  𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑀𝑀;   𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 ,𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 ,𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺 , 𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺 ,𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 ,𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 , 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 ≥ 0; 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 ,𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝐺𝐺 ≥ 0  𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾       (25) 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗
𝑅𝑅 , 𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 ,𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 ,𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 ,𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 ,𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 , 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅 ≥ 0  𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽;   𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 ,𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅 ≥ 0  𝑗𝑗 = 1, … 𝐽𝐽  𝑘𝑘 = 1 …𝐾𝐾    (26) 
 
Where equation (12) gives the achievement function to be minimised which is a specific form 
of achievement function (6). The parameters and decision variables in the second term have 
one less index that those of (6) as the network has two levels rather than the generic 𝐿𝐿 level 
case and hence the second term pertains solely to a single (second) network layer. The 
unwanted deviational variables in Equations (13-20) are underlined, these are hence the set of 
unwanted deviational variables to be minimised by achievement function (12).   Equations 
(13), (14), and (15) give the global level goals for energy generation, annual cost, and 
environmental impact respectively. Equation set (16) gives the goals for the global number of 
projects of the different electricity generation types selected. Equation sets (17), (18), and 
(19) give the 𝐽𝐽 regional level goals for energy generation, annual cost, and environmental 
impact respectively. Equation set (20) gives the 𝐽𝐽 regional level goals for the global number 
of projects of the different electricity generation types selected. Inequality set (21) ensures 
that the weighted, normalised, unwanted deviation from each global goal target is less than or 
equal to the maximal global value (𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺). Inequality set (22) ensures that for each region 𝑗𝑗 the 
weighted, normalised, unwanted deviation from each goal target is less than or equal to the 
maximal value for that region (𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅). Note that at both a global and at a regional level the 
deviations from the target numbers of projects to be funded are considered as a set rather than 
separately by technology type. This is to avoid over-emphasis being placed on this set of 
goals when calculating the maximal deviation. Inequality set (23) ensures that each region’s 
composite score (i.e. the parametric combination of the worst case and average deviations) is 
less than or equal to the worst case regional score (𝐷𝐷). Inequality set (24) ensures that at least 
the minimal number of projects is selected in each region. (25) and (26) give the set of sign 
restrictions for deviation variables in the model. It is noted that this model is a mixed binary 
problem that can be solved by an integer programming solution algorithm. The number of 
binary variables is equivalent to the number of potential projects (𝑀𝑀). A diagrammatic 
illustration of algebraic model (12)-(26) is given by Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagrammatic illustration of the renewable energy planning example  
 
4.2 Experimentation on Specific Instance 
 
In order to demonstrate the effects of the level of compensatory behaviour between objectives 
and between stakeholders and the level of centralisation in decision making, a specific four 
region instance of model (12)-(26) is constructed. The data giving region, type, energy 
output, cost and environmental impact of each project for this instance is given by Table 1. 
Furthermore, the global and regional targets and minimal projects per region are set as 
follows: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 350;  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 60;  𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸 = 15;  𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 = 4,𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,3;  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 = 80, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4;    
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 = 25, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4; 𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 = 5, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4;   𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4;   
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = 1, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,4,𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,3.  
  
An experimental analysis with respect to the three key parameters 𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼, and 𝛽𝛽 is conducted.  
In order to control the number of executions, the assumption that the level of compensatory 
behaviour between objectives remains constant throughout the network is made. That is, 𝛼𝛼 =
𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 = 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅  ∀𝑗𝑗. This is a reasonable assumption in the context of energy planning, where no 
regional or central stakeholder would wish to be seen as more or less compensatory in its 
approach than others, leading to a settling down around a common level of tolerance of 
compensation. These considerations give a three-parameter model, each of which is 
 
 
discretised into six points on its zero to one range (0.01, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.99). Note that the 
values of 0.01 and 0.99 have been used as the end points rather than 0 and 1 in order to avoid 
potential Pareto inefficiency at the meta-objective level. This leads to 216 optimisations, for 
which the average and maximal deviations at central and regional level are measured. This is 
in order to judge whether the parameters giving emphasis on centralisation, optimisation, and 
balance are working effectively and to draw conclusions about their effects.  As the min 
purpose is to investigate the effect of varying 𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼, and 𝛽𝛽,  an equal weight solution is used in 
order to ensure that all stakeholders and objectives are equally considered. The models are 
solved via the LINGO software on a PC machine with 3.10GHz processor speed and 4GB 
RAM, with all models solving in less than the minimal recording time of one second.  
 
Table 1: Project data for specific instance  
 
Project (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) Region Type Energy (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) Cost (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) Environmental 
Impact (𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖) 
1 1 1 34 12 5 
2 1 2 23 15 6 
3 1 1 24 18 7 
4 2 3 25 19 9 
5 2 1 56 45 3 
6 2 2 12 12 4 
7 3 2 14 34 6 
8 3 3 19 31 9 
9 3 2 72 64 2 
10 3 3 54 43 4 
11 4 3 12 14 7 
12 4 3 96 85 8 
13 4 1 54 45 9 
 
 
4.2.1 Results 
 
Figures 3-5 give the effects of varying the single parameters 𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼, and 𝛽𝛽 respectively, with 
each observation compromising of the mean of the relevant measure over the 36 values of the 
other two parameters. The four measures used are: 
 
• AGND: Average global normalised deviation:  �𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸
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• MGND: Maximum global weighted normalised deviation:  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
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• ARND: Average regional normalised deviation:  ∑ �𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
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• MRND: Maximum regional normalised deviation:  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅
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Figure 3: Effect of variance of parameter 𝑤𝑤 on set of measures 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Effect of variance of parameter 𝛼𝛼 on set of measures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of variance of parameter 𝛽𝛽 on set of measures 
 
Figures 6-8 give the effects of varying two of the three parameters within their defined range 
values. The same four measures as in Figures 3-5 (AGND, MGND, ARND, MRND) are 
used. Each observation is the mean of the six values of the third parameter.  
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Figure 6: Effect of variance of parameters 𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 on set of measures 
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Figure 7: Effect of variance of parameters 𝑤𝑤,𝛽𝛽 on set of measures 
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Figure 8: Effect of variance of parameters 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 on set of measures 
 
Figures 3-8 have focussed on the visualisation of the solution in parameter space, considering 
a set of measures that are essentially meta-objectives, that is they are functions of a number 
of unwanted deviation variables (Jones & Jimenez, 2013). This is in line with the focus of 
this paper which is that of parametric analysis of the meta-objective space. In order to 
understand the solution in the decision space (Jones, 2011), Table 2 presents the solutions 
found at the eight corner points of the parameter space and two central points. Columns 1-3 
give the solution in parameter space, columns 4-7 give the solution in the four dimensional 
meta-objective space, and column 8 gives the solution in decision space in terms of the set of 
funded projects.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Key solutions in meta-objective and decision space  
 
w Alpha Beta AGND MGND ARND MRND Projects Funded 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.794 1.400 0.528 1.200 1, 2, 4, 8, 11 
0.8 0.2 0.2 0.566 0.780 0.447 0.850 1, 6, 8, 11 
0.2 0.2 0.8 0.794 1.400 0.528 1.200 1,2,4,8,11 
0.8 0.2 0.8 0.565 0.780 0.447 0.850 1, 6, 8, 11 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.794 1.400 0.528 1.200 1, 2, 4, 8, 11 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.794  1.400 0.528 1.200 1, 2, 4, 8, 11 
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.882 1.667 0.562 1.600 1,2,4,6,8,11 
0.8 0.8 0.2 0.633 0.733 0.440 1.200 1,  2,  6, 10, 11 
0.2 0.8 0.8 0.882 1.667 0.562 1.600 1,2,4,6,8,11 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.633 0.733 0.440 1.200 1, 2, 6, 10, 11 
 
4.2.2 Discussion of Results  
 
Considering the first order effects, an increase in parameter 𝑤𝑤 (Figure 3) implies a growing 
level of centralisation of decision making, as the central decision maker retains a greater 
proportion of the total weight and passes down a lesser proportion to the lower network level. 
In the example, this is shown to have the effect of reducing (i.e. improving) all of the four 
measures, thus showing an advantage not only on the global level but also on the regional 
level. This shows that a level of benevolent coordination is of value in decision networks 
such as the one proposed in this paper. However, it is also noted that the level of 
improvement is more pronounced on the global than on the regional level. This shows that 
whilst centralisation of decision making may have symbiotic advantage for the whole 
network, the maximum level of improvement in the example is found at the central level. An 
increase in parameter 𝛼𝛼 (Figure 4) implies an increase in the level of non-compensation 
amongst objectives for all stakeholders across the network. That is, stakeholders are less 
willing to accept a worsening in the achieved value of one objective in order to gain an 
improved value in another objective. Figure 4 demonstrates that increasing the level of 
compensation amongst objectives in the example leads to worse values for all four measures. 
This indicates that if stakeholders were to allow for more flexibility in terms of trade-offs 
between objectives, then a better overall solution on both a global and regional scale could be 
achieved.  An increase in the parameter 𝛽𝛽 (Figure 5) implies an increase in the level of non-
compensation between stakeholders at different nodes in the network. That is, stakeholders 
are less willing to accept a worsening in their position in order that the overall position is 
improved. Figure 5 shows that increasing the level of non-compensation between 
stakeholders in the example leads to an improvement in all of the four measures. This shows 
that in order to build an effective consensus in the example, it is beneficial to ensure that all 
stakeholders are effectively represented and not overly disadvantaged to the gain of others.  
 
A common feature of all of the three single parameter effects (Figures 3-5) is that the 
sensitivity to parameter change is higher for the two maximal measures than for the two 
average measures. This indicates that determining the correct parametric mix or conducting 
sufficient parametric sensitivity analysis is important in ensuring that the “worst off” 
stakeholders in any decision are not overly disadvantaged. This will help to promote the 
building of a consensus amongst stakeholders.  
 
 
 
Considering the two parameter effects, Figures 6-8 confirm the conclusions drawn above 
from the single parameter effects. It can be seen that it most cases there is a general trend of 
increase in both of the parameter directions identified in the analysis of Figures 3-5. This 
trend is more pronounced in the two maximal measures, MGND and MGRD. It is noted, 
however that there are some extreme parameter values which negate the sensitivity of the 
other parameter. See for instance the 𝑤𝑤 = 0.99  value of all four measures in the 𝑤𝑤,𝛽𝛽 
parametric analysis of Figure 7. There is no sensitivity towards the parameter 𝛽𝛽 at this level. 
This is an indication of the fact that if an extreme degree of centralisation is used, the 
sensitivity between stakeholders is lost. Some of the two parameter analyses also demonstrate 
areas of stability in parameter space. For instance, the MRND graph of the 𝑤𝑤,𝛼𝛼 analysis 
shows there is an area of low 𝛼𝛼 and high 𝑤𝑤 that will lead to good values of this measure. This 
indicates a region with a high level of centralisation and low level of non-compensation 
between objectives where good values of regional balance can be found.  
 
With respect to the analysis of the solution in decision space given by Table 2, it can be seen 
that some solutions are repeated, again indicating a lack of sensitivity to parameter change in 
some, relatively limited regions in the parameter space. The trade-offs taking place in the 
meta-objective space across the entire region are evident from the values in the four meta-
objective columns. The last column demonstrates that, for this example, these changes are 
achieved by relatively small changes in decision space, with the addition or removal of 
marginal projects to a set of core projects that appear in all solutions. It is also recognised that 
some of the maximal deviations are significantly high, rising to a maximum deviation of 
1.667 beyond the goal value. This is mainly driven by the deliberate setting of challenging 
goal values in order to ensure Pareto inefficiency does not occur (Jones and Tamiz, 2010), 
but also results the challenge of satisfying all stake-holders across a multi-objective network.  
 
5 Conclusions.  
 
This paper has extended the methodology of extended goal programming to consider a 
decision network containing multiple stakeholders and objectives. The motivation for doing 
so was the occurrence of situations that require this type of co-ordinated network goal 
programme in the authors work on renewable energy. This should be regarded as an 
extension and enhancement of the goal programming paradigm to encompass the type of 
decision problems with conflicting objectives across a network of stakeholders that are now 
arising in modern applications. For instance (Jones & Wall, 2015) develop a single-layer 
extended goal programme for offshore wind farm location that would benefit from extension 
to a decision making network if greater number and types of renewable energy projects were 
to be included.  A demonstrative example from the renewable energy sector has been 
formulated in Section 4 and its results analysed. Although the model pertains to renewable 
energy, the methodology presented in Sections 2 and 3 is generic and hence the results could 
be applied to any decision network with multiple objectives and stakeholders. Potential 
examples could include transportation networks, computer networks, and decision making in 
large hierarchical organisations including defence organisations, universities, and health 
service providers.  
The inclusion of the numerical example in Section 4 is intended as a demonstrative concept. 
The presented results show that a parametric analysis is capable of producing a range of 
solutions that vary across decision, objective, and meta-objective space. The model presented 
in this paper can thus be used as a tool to generate solutions that will enhance the chances of 
a consensus between multiple stakeholders occurring. In the particular example in Section 4, 
 
 
this occurred with relatively high levels of centralisation, low levels of non-compensation 
between objectives, and high levels of non-compensation.  The prime usage of the model is in 
a prescriptive sense to produce implementable solutions to complex multi stakeholder multi-
objective decision network problems. It can, however, also be used in a more descriptive 
sense to simulate the effects of different levels of centralisation, non-compensation between 
objectives and non-compensation between stakeholders on the solutions generated in 
decision, objective and meta-objective space.  
This paper has presented the model as a complete technique, and it can be used as such. 
However, it also retains the flexibility associated in goal programming described in (Jones & 
Tamiz, 2010). This includes the ability to incorporate different underlying philosophies and 
to combine with other techniques from the fields of Operational Research and/or artificial 
intelligence to enhance decision making capability.  
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